By setting his sights on the island of Greenland, President Trump has provoked, as usual, a mixture of consternation, opprobrium and widespread hilarity on the international stage. Most of the comments limited themselves to criticizing his style and his moodiness: he spoke of a “large real estate deal” and, in the face of a refusal to sell, he canceled his planned visit and described the Danish Prime Minister’s reaction as “nasty”. More astute observers have pointed out that Trump's initiative is less whimsical than it might seem at first glance – it is part of a regional policy America has been pursuing for a while. In any case, for Europeans it is not what really matters. What is essential, to them, is rather the exposure, in broad daylight, of an American reasoning that is as compelling as it is uncomfortable.

The recent entry into office of the new Italian government was received, in media and financial circles, as well as by most European leaders, with a mixture of indignation and concern. How could Italy—one of the founding members of the Union and its birthplace due to the Treaty of Rome—bring to power Eurosceptic, anti-establishment forces likely to jeopardize the stability of the euro and to create unprecedented tensions within the EU? The alliance between the far-right League and the Five Star Movement (M5S) stemming from a leftist, anti-globalization ideology, is regarded by many as the unfortunate confirmation of the rise of all kinds of “populisms” and therefore as a reversal of the virtuous pro-European momentum generated by last year’s election of French President Emmanuel Macron.

A couple of seconds within a two-and-a-half hour television interview propelled French President Macron on the front pages of international media, as the one who claims he persuaded President Trump to change his policy in Syria. Macron repeated four times that "we convinced him” to maintain US troops in the country and to limit air strikes to the regime’s chemical weapons sites. This publicly made statement is more than a diplomatic gaffe. It also, and above all, reveals that the French president is tempted by a rather naive approach to relations with America, the same that had, time and time again, led Britain into an impasse.

The turbulences in the European and transatlantic skies over the course of the past year obviously have not been without impact on the coexistence between the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union's (EU) Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). Long-time taboos have been lifted, initiatives are multiplying, new perspectives seem to open up, and immediately generate powerful backlashes. The outcome will depend largely, once again, on the choices made, and determination displayed, by France.

At the mid-October EU summit, President Macron joined the so-called Declaration No. 52, ten years after the Lisbon Treaty was adopted and France decided not to sign the annexed Declaration on EU symbols.[1] If the new French president chose to reverse policy at this particular moment, it is primarily as a response to far-left leader Mélenchon’s recent call to ban the European flag from the Assemblée nationale (the Lower House of the Parliament). Whereas the Declaration is legally non-binding, the move is intended, in Emmanuel Macron’s words, to “assert the attachment” of France to the symbols of Europe. One point that seems to have been largely overlooked, is that the meaning of those symbols can be very different, depending on whether one refers to the French or English version of the text.

"For the next five years, on the domestic front, the main challenge will be the feeling of alienation of a large majority of the French population. This comes both from the divide between globalization’s winners and losers, and from what is widely perceived as an increasingly assertive presence of Islam. On the European front, there is an unprecedented window of opportunity for the protective, strategic, autonomous EU project France has always advocated, but the key to achieve this still resides in the implementation of the multispeed model."

I had the pleasure to discuss the results of German elections, in a broader European context, with Ronald Granieri and Jeremy Black at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. To listen to the conversation, please click here.

 “One only comes out of ambiguity to their own detriment,” this maxim often repeated by former President François Mitterrand sounds like a premonitory warning in the aftermath of Emmanuel Macron’s election in France.

NATO’s counter-terrorism efforts have been the focus of much attention in recent months. Faced with a U.S. ultimatum that Washington might “moderate its commitment” to the Alliance, member states have sought ways to demonstrate that the organization plays a significant part in global counter-terrorism efforts and that it could do even more.

The concurrence between Brexit (expected to revitalize a European defence on which London has always imposed strict limits) and the election of D. Trump in the United States (shedding light on the risks and uncertainties stemming from a situation of dependency) seems to have an almost seismic effect on the architecture of European and transatlantic security.

During a discussion at the Atlantic Council in Washington, the European Union’s High Representative was quite adamant, repeating the same words three times, in calling for America to not interfere in European affairs. Nothing could be more legitimate, one would say. Provided that Europeans stick to it as a general rule (and not a mere case by case grievance, this time triggered by controversial statements from president Trump).

NATO "obsolete", the Brexit "a success"? The bluntly expressed views of the U.S. president-elect[1] are the best thing that has happened to France’s European policy[2] over the past quarter of a century.

"In the face of great powers, old ones as well as new, France must reaffirm its independence ... few countries have by their defense - in other words their armed forces and foreign policy - the capacity to decide sovereignly. We do have it. And we must do everything possible to preserve this strategic freedom."[1]

At the last NATO summit in Warsaw, the top priority was to demonstrate, as the last paragraph of the final communiqué declares, "our unity, our solidarity and our strength". But on each of the three points, serious doubts remain. Whether it is unity (common front against commonly perceived threats), solidarity (an attack against one of the members considered an attack against all) or force (in the area of intelligence, decision-making , deployment of troops), the allies' attitude reveals deeply set tensions.

According to the German weekly Der Spiegel, the issue of a European alternative to the (presumed) U.S. nuclear umbrella has been, for monthes, the object of informal, off-the-record dicussions within NATO.

In the wake of the British referendum, U.S. Vice President Joe Biden noted, "We would have preferred a different outcome."[1] A few days later, Secretary of State Kerry said that it was still possible to "walk back" on Brexit.[2] Neither the disappointment nor the hope that the situation could still be reversed came as a surprise from the American side. Indeed, over the last six decades, Washington spared no effort to put, then keep, in the EU their favorite ally. The reason is simple. As explained by the U.S. Embassy in London, the European Union is "the world’s most important organization to which the United States does not belong". In order to make its voice heard, the U.S. needs their "man inside" or, in diplomatic terms, "the expression within the EU of common U.S.-UK attitudes through UK membership".[3] Except that British voters opted for the exit...

In 1975, at the time of the first British referendum on whether the United Kingdom should leave or remain in what was then the European Communities, a caricature of the Canard enchaîné depicted Prime Minister Harold Wilson in bed on a voluptuous, but visibly bored Europa who pleads: “In or out, my dear Wilson, but stop this ridiculous back and forth.”[1] It was more than forty years ago ... Four decades during which the UK has carefully kept their notoriously “semi-detached position” vis-a-vis Europe.

After deliberately de-Europeanising the name of the group formerly known as EADS, the CEO of Airbus remains true to his vision. When it comes to the announced selling of the defense electric branch, Tom Enders declares he is indifferent to the acquirer's nationality, as only the price matters ...

Should the SNP’s (Scottish National Party) anti-nuclear stance be a problem for an independent Scotland eager to keep its membership card in NATO ?* In short, not really. Calling for the removal of UK nuclear weapons from its territory and becoming a non-nuclear state is not a priori inconsistent with membership in NATO. Reminder: 20 member countries out of the current 28 do not possess and/or host any nuclear weapons on their soil.

The dynamic of relations between the United Kingdom and the European Union cannot be understood in its totality and in its specificity without taking into account the role played by the United States, particularly through the relationship that London would like to believe "special." Be it directly, indirectly, or even sometimes paradoxically, the American/Atlanticist tropism of the British political and media establishment is at the root of many of their positions considered as skeptical or downright hostile vis-à-vis the European integration.

The special position of the UK in the European and transatlantic security field will be one of the key defining elements both for the attitude of other States vis-a-vis a possible Scottish independence (would or would not they prefer to see London weakened even if just temporarily), and for their appreciation of the policies pursued by an independent Scotland (would they be in line with, or different from, those of Whitehall). Looking at the possibility of Scottish independence from a transatlantic-European security perspective implies examining three different albeit closely related subjects:

This (and similar) kind of information could only become “explosive” if, thanks to the Wikileaks “scoop” for instance, the general public began to ask serious questions. And not about America – but about their own leaders' behaviour.

All too often, it is tempting to equate American nuclear presence in Europe to its sole tangible dimension. Namely the stationing of hundreds of U.S. bombs in five countries of the European continent, as part of NATO and of its so-called "nuclear sharing". And it is a mistake to do so.

Hailed (or intensely disparaged, it depends) as a "return to the fold", would the reintegration by France of the integrated military structures end up exploding the Alliance? The question is paradoxical only in appearance.

The year 2008 was that of a triple anniversary and of a double illusion with regard to European defence. Fifteen years ago, the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty marks the official launch of the CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy), with the prospect of a possible future defence component.

The following brief overview proposes to summarize the principal developments of the year 2007 in the field of European defence. In this regard, two preliminary remarks are of order. The first one is terminological; it relates to the denomination ESDP (European security and defence policy) used up to now, present paper included. It is bound to become, once the new treaty ratified, CSDP (Common security and defence policy). The second remark consists in stressing that the developments and the debates in 2007 continue to revolve around the most controversial concept in European defence, namely the term of ‘autonomy’.

These last months saw the forceful return of the good old debate on “protectionism” versus liberalism. In other words, on the respective roles of the politics and the economic, or face to face between the logic of power and the logic of the market. With the implicit question about the need for a “European preference”, and the immediate spotlight this directs on the inherent contradictions of the liberal-Atlantic credo.

How can we reconcile two fundamentally different logics: that of the armaments sector with all the strategic imperatives linked to it, and that of the European construction which oscillates between a quasi-political entity and a mere large market? Intervention at the European Trade Union Symposium of the FNTE (National Federation of the Workers of the State) of the CGT.

Contrary to the two dominant, albeit diametrically opposed, types of forecasts that were both highly fashionable a few years ago, it appears more and more clearly that the headaches related to the EU-NATO conundrum are here to stay. Those who, in view of the initial difficulties of establishing mutually acceptable relations between the two organizations, were talking about teething problems likely to be replaced, in due course, by a harmonious insertion of the new-born European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) into the Atlantic system, were just as wrong as those who saw in it yet another occasion to toll the death knell of the North Atlantic Alliance. As it is, neither of the two scenarios seems close to becoming a reality any time soon.

The European avant-garde has a sense and a legitimacy only if it is inspired by a strategic vision, aiming to the reinforcement of all the aspects of European sovereignty. Only such a project will be able to contribute to the safeguarding of a "certain idea of Europe": that of a fully-fledged geopolitical actor able to guarantee our security, to promote our values and our interests and to defend our economic, social, environmental and cultural model.

After listing some of the major stakes related to the armament sector, a brief historical reminder is devoted to clarifying the context of the current debates. Then certain general characteristics of the American and European defence industries are going to be examined. Finally, misleading myths are to be deciphered, in particular the imposture of the technological “gap”, the holy horror inspired by the concept of “fortress Europe” and the tendentious praise of “complementarity”.

During the last year of the Clinton administration and the first nine months of the Bush team in power, a broad consensus had taken shape in the expert conferences and semi-official meetings on the two sides of the Atlantic: everyone agreed that the NMD (National Missile Defense) was going to become "the" great topic of controversy of the following months and years.

NATO’s Riga summit, held at the end of last November, was the typical example of a spectacular non-event. Striking especially by the contrast between the publicity made for the gathering of 26 Heads of State and government on the one hand, and the piteous outcome of the meeting on the other. The marketing-type announcements planned for the occasion had gradually left the place to the invading reality represented by the deplorable performance of the allies in Afghanistan. This latter being, in addition, only one of the (far too) many symptoms of the growing malaise within Alliance.

The armaments sector is the par excellence strategic field, be it in geopolitical, economic or technological terms. Due to the coincidence between the most abstract questions related to sovereignty and the most tangible nature of the products (origin, composition, design), the policies pursued in this area are particularly revealing of, and determining for, the direction Europe is about to take.

In the public relations offensive carried out from Brussels - with the explicit or implicit support of a large part of the private industrial sector - article 296 is presented as being at the origin of the European fragmentation in the armament field. The only error of this otherwise attractive reasoning is that it confuses cause and consequence. Because far from being the source, article 296 is rather the reflection of our divisions. In particular that of the divergences, not to say differences, of intra-European viewpoints on the very idea we have on Europe’s future: power or not, European or not.

The present paper offers a brief overview of the terminological-historical, theoretical and political aspects of “differentiated integration” scenarios. It argues that although “flexibility” is the only way to consolidate the acquis and pursue the integration project, differentiation does not automatically lead to a more ambitious, more powerful and more European Europe. In order to ensure this outcome, the flexibility pioneers must pay particular attention to two paramount criteria.

The so-called code of conduct, which came into effect on July 1, 2006 with the participation of 22 Member States of the Union and is supposed to encourage the “Europeanization” of defence procurement, is only the beginning. It marks the entry in scene, in implacably concrete terms, of the fundamental political questions (differed since more than a half-century) of the European construction. As a beginning, it is by nature imperfect and ambiguous. But at the same time, it reflects perfectly the possibilities and the limits of the political will that is at its origin. 

As for the systematically hidden choice between European dependence or independence, in the texts, everything seems crystal clear. When the ESDP (European Security and Defense Policy) was launched in June 1999 in Cologne, the Declaration of the Fifteen immediately stipulated the need for autonomy and credibility of the Union's means and assets. This is in line with the objectives set out in Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union, in particular the "safeguarding of the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity" of the EU. However, not only are we still waiting to see when these beautiful words will be translated into deeds, but the very question of whether they should be one day remains an object of debate.

First of all, it is worth underlining that neither the French elections of 2007, nor those in the United States in 2008 are bound to alter in a notable way - i.e. in addition to the gestures and effect-based announcements scheduled for these occasions - the traditional orientations of the two countries’ foreign and security policies. Likewise, the calvaries of the new European treaty, the actual rhythm of the EU’s blind rush to enlargement, and the endless transatlantic initiatives based on stylistic changes in Washington are equally secondary from the point of view of the real evolutions in European integration and in our relationship with the United States.

The process of European integration is, without any doubt, the most significant political innovation of the last half-century. Born out of the feeling of necessity, it has been guided by the hope that the construction of a community between European countries may eventually pave the way for the organization of tomorrow’s world. However, our subject here is not to dwell on how brilliant, necessary and promising the project is. In fact, the credibility and legitimacy of the European process today are weakened both inside and outside, in particular by the gulf between rhetoric and reality.

Euro-American relations are periodically tarnished by so-called "misunderstandings", verbal skirmishes, diplomatic incidents and other manifestations of mutual distrust that seem to rise out of nowhere, literally from one day to the next. Their perception is actually dramatized by the fact that they emerge from under the cover of what is presented as an impeccable relationship, based on a much-touted community of values and interests. This contradiction increases the risk of visceral reactions on both sides of the Atlantic: anti-Americanism in Europe and Europe-bashing in the United States.

When we examine the relationship between civilizations, one should first of all make a clear distinction between State actors, which do have the right and the capacity for political action, and cultural spheres of variable scale and cohesion, which do not. As the excellent American analyst, William Pfaff observed: "None of these civilizations, rather arbitrarily defined, is or ever was, as such, a political actor or a political entity. Nations act. Governments wage wars. But civilizations are not political units and there is no hint that they will ever become one". This does not mean, far from it, as one will see it hereafter, an underestimation of cultural and identity-related factors.

According to a widely known phrase pronounced by then Luxemburg Foreign Minister Jacques Poos at the beginning of the 1990’s, the EU is “an economic giant, a political dwarf and a military worm”. Whereas far from being incorrect, this definition needs some updating and, most of all, serious clarification.

The present framework only allows an inevitably approximate overall outline of the political processes and strategic stakes behind the armament issues. The conducting line is simple: in the field of defence industries and technologies, we are talking about the material bases of sovereignty, in other words the concrete pillars of the autonomous capacity to decide and to act. Each and every measure with regard to research, development, production and procurement is a political decision in the strictest sense of the term. It is therefore in this quality that it must be apprehended and transferred from the intimate circle of specialists right onto the public place. Since political decisions deserve political debate.

“Europe pays the price of her usual cowardice and, once again, the majority of the politicians only think of capitulating. However, on the long run, it is like adding fuel to the fire.” The more so as “the agitation of today is merely an episode in an infinitely broader power struggle.”

According to Eurobarometer, it is in the new Member States - with their governments carefully aligned on American positions - that public opinion seems to be most favourable to the “Europe of Defence”. The surveys knock over the stereotypes... For the full text in English, please contact the author.

Galileo (the European satellite navigation system whose construction is now also pursued in space after the launching of the first test satellite) is one of the decisive strategic projects of the decade. In every, including military, sense of the term. It prefers, of course, remain low-profile in this regard. Even when others point out the facts, it tries to deny with vehemence.

The current paper on the European Union's security and defence policy examines the issue of 1. Developments in year 2005; 2. Public opinion and democratic control; 3. Defence industry and technologies; 4. Civilian aspects of crisis management; 5. Cooperation with the United Nations. 

John Keegan, one of the world's most widely known military historians, examines this time an issue often evoked both in the universe of fiction and in that of politics: intelligence. In an unusual way and with unusual conclusions.

The present study begins by examining the concept of "strategic culture", before attempting to take stock of the numerous dividing lines between the EU’s Member States in this field. To conclude, it focuses on the forces which allow or prevent from overcoming these divergences. By underlining all along that the real question does not relate to the feasibility of a possible synthesis, but rather to its substance. In other words, the question is to know whether a common European security culture could ever have any meaningful strategic dimension. 

Europe today is characterized by a strategic and identity-related vagueness: she is without geographical and political outlines. Her geographical borders are still imprecise towards the East and South, as well as towards the West. As for European sovereignty, it is in a sort of no man’s land: the Member States abandon entire sectors of their national sovereignty without there being anything, at a European level, resembling a political entity ready and able to defend Europeans’ capacity to decide and to act autonomously.

The present analysis examines one of the crucial points of the debates on the European Union’s evolution, namely the issue of "differentiation". With respect to this integration approach, commonly known under the names of "multi-speed Europe", "hard core" or "variable geometry", the paper underlines the fact that in itself this is neither a positive, nor a negative category. Whether increasing differentiation will lead to the disintegration or the revitalization of the integration depends, in fine, on two things: in the service of which policy and applying which modalities these flexibility measures will be put in practice.

It is impressive to see that with each election the majority of comments are ready to fall and to fall again in the same trap. Taking rhetoric for granted and despizing geopolitical realities, they tell us – some of them with enthusiasm, others with apprehension – how foreign policy is bound to undergo a fundamental change. It is, however, far from being that simple.

EU-NATO relations are merely a symptom. They are the reflection of the power struggle between the two sides of the Atlantic on the one hand, and of intra-European schizophrenia on the other. At the heart of this complex arm-wrestling there is one single crucial issue at stake: European autonomy. As regards the choice allegedly to be made between EU-NATO co-operation or competition, this is a false dilemma. In the current balance of power situation, both are inevitable.

The day after the terrorist „incidents” in London, it is worth noting that what happened is not a surprise, not a failure, not a European awakening, and not the beginning of a new Londonian era. The main characteristic of yesterday’s series of attempts in the British capital is that it has not changed a single thing as regards to the terrorist threat and the requirements of the fight against it. Those political or journalistic rhetorics that claim the contrary are merely looking for pretext.

UK’s accession would mark the beginning of a dilution process at the end of which “there would appear a colossal Atlantic Community under American dependence and leadership, which would soon swallow up the European Community”. The prophetic words of General de Gaulle, in 1963, have not ceased being confirmed ever since.

The enlargement of the European Union in 2004 was a mistake. It was plainly obvious since old Member States appeared unable to seize the opportunity which arised with François Mitterrand’s European confederation project, and did not have the political will to start any other form of ambition-based political differentiation during the decade which followed.

There is only one question worth asking in all this chaos surrounding the constitutional treaty. It is to know whether this crisis is finally "the" crisis. The answer depends on the political will of the Member States’ leaders, that of France and Germany in the first place. The suffering is the result of not merely the last, but of all past enlargements. The Heads of State and government of the Six, in 1969 in the Hague, only gave their assent for the opening of the accession negotiations "insofar as the candidate States accept the treaties and their political finalities".

There is no doubt that France has always constituted the cornerstone of the whole European construction: in its capacity as the guardian of the temple: the one who watches the project being kept on its original political track and who reminds the others to bear in mind the pursuit of those strategic purposes.

The theses on the (alleged) powerlessness of Europe and on the (supposedly) benevolent (self-proclaimed) omnipotence of the United States reveal a profound ignorance.

„Why is the American government supporting and subsidizing US aircraft industry through defence contracts? Simply because the future of the US, and of Europe in our case, is not in perfume or popcorn. The future is in electronics, computers, aircraft, missiles and space.” – the remark was made by Jean Pierson, ex-president of Airbus Industrie, in 1987.

The eventful history of the military aircraft Joint Strike Fighter (F35) is like an educational fable. It enables us to contemplate on the one hand the sometimes almost perverse mechanisms of US foreign and defence policy and, on the other, the process of voluntary abandonment of European positions and strengths. In short, it acts as an eminently instructive “digest” of the transatlantic relationship.

The concept of strategic, political, operational and industrial-technological autonomy lies at the heart of the connection linking together the substantial-existential and practical-implementational aspects of ESDP.

If the year 2005 is that of United Nations, it is not so much because of the festivities around its 60th birthday, but rather because of the report of a High-level Panel of personalities, deposited last December on the request of the Secretary-General, and entitled "A more secure world". Indeed, the fate which will be reserved to the content of this document of a hundred pages will send a strong message, be it positive or negative, regarding the future of the organization.

The paper starts by defining the main criteria of what can be called the European Security Model, and then examines the role qnd pertinence of this latter in the fight against terrorism.

It is not the United States which behaves in an unexplainable way, but we Europeans. Indeed, Washington's acts and deeds are completely foreseeable, in conformity with its position. This does not make them less dangerous neither for themselves, nor for others, and does not reduce the enormous gap between their pretended intentions and their genuine aspirations. But America’s behaviour is fundamentally logical.

From the French point of view enlargement cannot relegate to the second plan the aspiration to European independence and prosperity. On the contrary: the CEE countries’ accession must be carried out in a way to serve the cause of the preservation of the European model and of Europe's sovereignty.

It is not "in a galaxy far, far away", but nevertheless beyond the Earth's atmosphere that one of the most enthralling rounds of the transatlantic match takes place. Although we cannot speak about genuine competition. Whereas for the United States the stake is to ensure an absolute control over all space activities, Europe, for its part, can only aspire to try to avoid total dependence.

The area of security and defence policy is the one registering the most noticeable positive shifts within the new EU Treaty (referred to as the constitution). These novelties - along with all finally adopted arrangements - are crucial regardless of the "constitution's" immediate fate: they demonstrate the delicate equilibrium between the minimum requirement for effective functioning and the maximum degree of political willingness at the level of the Twenty-Five.

The mixed report of the EU Commission on Turkey’s accession marked the end of a double deceit. The one which made Ankara believe in the mirage of fully-fledged membership (obviously already as a candidate Turkey does not have the same rights as others). And the other one intended for the European public opinion and pretending that successive enlargements do not basically alter the Union’s very nature. Because it is precisely what they do.

By pure coincidence, it was in Madrid, in December 1995, that the EU summit took place, where on the matter of terrorism the heads of state and government of the Fifteen stated for the first time what they could not but repeat eight years later – following the terrorist attacks on 11 March 2004 in the Spanish capital.

A three-level dividing line is to be found at the root of the European foreign, security and defence policy’s deep contradictions. Member States range on one or the other side based upon their position regarding the content of integration, the transatlantic relations and the desirable shape of future international order (including Europe’s place and role within it).

European-American structural tensions – breeding for decades and becoming acute with the end of the bipolar era – were merely brought onto surface by the Iraq crisis. Beyond the official pseudo-vision and occasional visions represented by German hesitations, the two genuine, concurring visions about Europe, transatlantic relations and the international order are advocated respectively by the British and the French.

A casual observer of Concordia – code-name for the European Union’s first-ever military operation, conducted in Macedonia – would be first impressed by the abundance of symbols in almost every aspect of the mission. Not only do the politicians’ declarations put the emphasis on the „symbolic European message” carried by the operation[1] or present it as a „significant step forward in the long process of European integration”[2], but also the EU seems determined to plant its blue flag all over the place in order to increase its visibility – a goal explicitly identified as one of the key objectives of  the mission.[3]

The necessity for the European Union (EU) to play a more assertive role in the Balkans is on the agenda now more than ever. In fact, after the events of 11 September 2001, the withdrawal of the bulk of the US troops from the region and their replacement by European contingents is, for the first time, considered as a politically feasible (and militarily sensible) option. At the same time, the EU’s evolving defense policy has been declared “operational” at the Laeken summit in December 2001,[1] with all the related institutions in place and with the Western European Union’s (WEU) crisis management capabilities and functions transferred to the EU. The EU is therefore theoretically the actor that is most competent to play a military role (in addition to other, more traditional aspects of EU crisis management) in the neighboring Balkan region.

Specificities of the EU’s situation and reaction Responses by sphere of activity Justice and Home Affairs Diplomacy and common foreign, security and defence policy Humanitarian assistance Air traffic safety Economic and financial measures Civil protection Long-term tendencies Collective defence Institutional flexibility Inter-pillars fusion Widening and deepening Mediterranean dimension Sustainable globalisation

The European Security ESDI-CESDP Study Group (ESSG) has held his second 2002 meeting in Bern, Switzerland on April 21-23, 2002, as scheduled, on the invitation of the Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs. The meeting focused on "The Impact of the "Global War On Terrorism" ("GWOT") on European Security"