Two things are clear from the contradictory statements of Western politicians - some of them rejecting even the idea of negotiation, whereas others discretely considering the ins and outs of a future settlement. First, the limits and risks of the strategy pursued so far have now become evident. This does not mean that Moscow is in a better position, but we are obviously more interested in the economy, security and unity of the NATO-EU side. And the situation is anything but bright. Secondly, the fact that so far there has been no meaningful move towards a diplomatic solution is due to the fact that the search for a peaceful way out is a politically hazardous endeavor. It could both shatter the Western unity that has been masterfully maintained up to now and put into question the mainstream narrative on the war.

War is raging in Europe: in Ukraine under Russian attack, women and children are fleeing, ordinary citizens are taking up arms, and historic buildings find themselves in ruins. But as always, war is a transitional state between two phases dominated by diplomacy. On the one hand, it derives from the obvious failure of the previous negotiations, and on the other, it aims to broker, on the basis of new positions, a new power equilibrium as opposed to the earlier situation. Therefore the West, including Europe, needs first and foremost to keep a cool head. The reactive steps taken in the midst of overheated emotions can only be adequately gauged according to whether the conflict is being limited or intensified by them and whether they will lead to a post-war security situation that is advantageous or detrimental to us.

The recently launched one-year-long collective brainstorming on the future of the Union is an attractive idea indeed. By seeking input directly from the citizens, it is planned to serve as the basis for reforming the EU – and who knows: maybe even have another go at the treaty itself. However, this sympathetic scenario needs nuancing from the outset. First of all, the conclusions are already in the bag. Secondly, on fundamental political issues, the EU will remain just as incapable after. Thirdly, posing the question of the European Union’s common future is a mistake by itself. If they insist on the 27-member format, Europe will have no future whatsoever. It will write itself out of History, and its fate will be decided by outside powers.

In deciding to give an interview to The Economist where he declared NATO “brain dead,” President Emmanuel Macron certainly knew he would spark indignation among his fellow European leaders. He chose to do it nevertheless, not out of proverbial French arrogance, but because he deems it both necessary and urgent. A year away from the next U.S. elections (and with Brexit forever dragging on), an unprecedented window of opportunity is about to slam shut for France.

For the past twenty years, the United States has been pushing the Alliance to become “global”, on the grounds that it must adapt to new risks and threats if it wants “to stay relevant” (meaning: to be useful for American interests and to ensure, in exchange, that the USA stays engaged on the old continent). After all, it is only fair. Except that for the European allies this would mechanically lead to giving up their own policies. The challenge for them would therefore be to prevent, as much as possible, the expansion of NATO’s competencies to other (non-military) domains and to other (non-euro-Atlantic) geographical areas. For one of the main rationales behind NATO “going global” is to make sure that Europeans – who, in NATO, find themselves in a subordinate position vis-à-vis the USA – formulate their various policies no longer on their own, but within the U.S.-led Atlantic Alliance.

By setting his sights on the island of Greenland, President Trump has provoked, as usual, a mixture of consternation, opprobrium and widespread hilarity on the international stage. Most of the comments limited themselves to criticizing his style and his moodiness: he spoke of a “large real estate deal” and, in the face of a refusal to sell, he canceled his planned visit and described the Danish Prime Minister’s reaction as “nasty”. More astute observers have pointed out that Trump's initiative is less whimsical than it might seem at first glance – it is part of a regional policy America has been pursuing for a while. In any case, for Europeans it is not what really matters. What is essential, to them, is rather the exposure, in broad daylight, of an American reasoning that is as compelling as it is uncomfortable.

France and Germany recently decided to share the presidency of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and jointly do the agenda-setting and public communication tasks it involves, over the next two months. What could be an important symbol appears, however, more like a smokescreen to conceal the two partners’ skirmishes over their respective UN seats. The Germans wish to see France’s permanent member status Europeanized—in other words, transferred to the European Union as a whole. Paris continues to respond to such suggestions with a resounding non. At first glance, this disagreement might look like French national “egoism” standing in the way of Germany’s splendid ambitions for Europe. On closer inspection, however, it is rather the other way around.

The quarrel of a bluffer and a buffoon over a nonsensical idea. One could caricature in these terms the controversy that took place, by means of interviews and tweets, between the French and American presidents after the former floated the murky concept of a so-called European army. It is hard to say exactly what motivated the French president at that moment, knowing that if there is a country for which the pooling of European forces would mean a net loss, not to say a fatal disaster, it is France. No doubt Emmanuel Macron is fully aware of this, in which case he must have found that the greatest merit of the concept is that it has no chance to become a reality. It also had all the potential to irritate President Trump, incidentally.

With the recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and the decision to transfer the U.S. embassy there, U.S. President Donald Trump has made a first step to break one of Europe’s most deeply anchored reflexes. As former European Commissioner Chris Patten noted, “The main determinant Europe’s political behavior” is, on the Israel-Palestine issue in particular, “the Pavlovian rejection of any course of action that might distance Europe from the Americans.”

At the mid-October EU summit, President Macron joined the so-called Declaration No. 52, ten years after the Lisbon Treaty was adopted and France decided not to sign the annexed Declaration on EU symbols.[1] If the new French president chose to reverse policy at this particular moment, it is primarily as a response to far-left leader Mélenchon’s recent call to ban the European flag from the Assemblée nationale (the Lower House of the Parliament). Whereas the Declaration is legally non-binding, the move is intended, in Emmanuel Macron’s words, to “assert the attachment” of France to the symbols of Europe. One point that seems to have been largely overlooked, is that the meaning of those symbols can be very different, depending on whether one refers to the French or English version of the text.

NATO’s counter-terrorism efforts have been the focus of much attention in recent months. Faced with a U.S. ultimatum that Washington might “moderate its commitment” to the Alliance, member states have sought ways to demonstrate that the organization plays a significant part in global counter-terrorism efforts and that it could do even more.

In the wake of the British referendum, U.S. Vice President Joe Biden noted, "We would have preferred a different outcome."[1] A few days later, Secretary of State Kerry said that it was still possible to "walk back" on Brexit.[2] Neither the disappointment nor the hope that the situation could still be reversed came as a surprise from the American side. Indeed, over the last six decades, Washington spared no effort to put, then keep, in the EU their favorite ally. The reason is simple. As explained by the U.S. Embassy in London, the European Union is "the world’s most important organization to which the United States does not belong". In order to make its voice heard, the U.S. needs their "man inside" or, in diplomatic terms, "the expression within the EU of common U.S.-UK attitudes through UK membership".[3] Except that British voters opted for the exit...

In 1975, at the time of the first British referendum on whether the United Kingdom should leave or remain in what was then the European Communities, a caricature of the Canard enchaîné depicted Prime Minister Harold Wilson in bed on a voluptuous, but visibly bored Europa who pleads: “In or out, my dear Wilson, but stop this ridiculous back and forth.”[1] It was more than forty years ago ... Four decades during which the UK has carefully kept their notoriously “semi-detached position” vis-a-vis Europe.

What does the reelection of Barack Obama mean for Europe? Besides continuity, will there be more intransigence on certain issues or, on the contrary, will there be a bit more attention to the sensibilities of his allies? These are the kinds of questions with which European leaders continue to harass both their advisers and all those who agree to be invited by them in Washington DC. 

This (and similar) kind of information could only become “explosive” if, thanks to the Wikileaks “scoop” for instance, the general public began to ask serious questions. And not about America – but about their own leaders' behaviour.

Hailed (or intensely disparaged, it depends) as a "return to the fold", would the reintegration by France of the integrated military structures end up exploding the Alliance? The question is paradoxical only in appearance.

The so-called code of conduct, which came into effect on July 1, 2006 with the participation of 22 Member States of the Union and is supposed to encourage the “Europeanization” of defence procurement, is only the beginning. It marks the entry in scene, in implacably concrete terms, of the fundamental political questions (differed since more than a half-century) of the European construction. As a beginning, it is by nature imperfect and ambiguous. But at the same time, it reflects perfectly the possibilities and the limits of the political will that is at its origin. 

“Europe pays the price of her usual cowardice and, once again, the majority of the politicians only think of capitulating. However, on the long run, it is like adding fuel to the fire.” The more so as “the agitation of today is merely an episode in an infinitely broader power struggle.”

Galileo (the European satellite navigation system whose construction is now also pursued in space after the launching of the first test satellite) is one of the decisive strategic projects of the decade. In every, including military, sense of the term. It prefers, of course, remain low-profile in this regard. Even when others point out the facts, it tries to deny with vehemence.

The current paper on the European Union's security and defence policy examines the issue of 1. Developments in year 2005; 2. Public opinion and democratic control; 3. Defence industry and technologies; 4. Civilian aspects of crisis management; 5. Cooperation with the United Nations. 

John Keegan, one of the world's most widely known military historians, examines this time an issue often evoked both in the universe of fiction and in that of politics: intelligence. In an unusual way and with unusual conclusions.

Europe today is characterized by a strategic and identity-related vagueness: she is without geographical and political outlines. Her geographical borders are still imprecise towards the East and South, as well as towards the West. As for European sovereignty, it is in a sort of no man’s land: the Member States abandon entire sectors of their national sovereignty without there being anything, at a European level, resembling a political entity ready and able to defend Europeans’ capacity to decide and to act autonomously.

It is impressive to see that with each election the majority of comments are ready to fall and to fall again in the same trap. Taking rhetoric for granted and despizing geopolitical realities, they tell us – some of them with enthusiasm, others with apprehension – how foreign policy is bound to undergo a fundamental change. It is, however, far from being that simple.

The day after the terrorist „incidents” in London, it is worth noting that what happened is not a surprise, not a failure, not a European awakening, and not the beginning of a new Londonian era. The main characteristic of yesterday’s series of attempts in the British capital is that it has not changed a single thing as regards to the terrorist threat and the requirements of the fight against it. Those political or journalistic rhetorics that claim the contrary are merely looking for pretext.

UK’s accession would mark the beginning of a dilution process at the end of which “there would appear a colossal Atlantic Community under American dependence and leadership, which would soon swallow up the European Community”. The prophetic words of General de Gaulle, in 1963, have not ceased being confirmed ever since.

The enlargement of the European Union in 2004 was a mistake. It was plainly obvious since old Member States appeared unable to seize the opportunity which arised with François Mitterrand’s European confederation project, and did not have the political will to start any other form of ambition-based political differentiation during the decade which followed.

There is only one question worth asking in all this chaos surrounding the constitutional treaty. It is to know whether this crisis is finally "the" crisis. The answer depends on the political will of the Member States’ leaders, that of France and Germany in the first place. The suffering is the result of not merely the last, but of all past enlargements. The Heads of State and government of the Six, in 1969 in the Hague, only gave their assent for the opening of the accession negotiations "insofar as the candidate States accept the treaties and their political finalities".

There is no doubt that France has always constituted the cornerstone of the whole European construction: in its capacity as the guardian of the temple: the one who watches the project being kept on its original political track and who reminds the others to bear in mind the pursuit of those strategic purposes.

The theses on the (alleged) powerlessness of Europe and on the (supposedly) benevolent (self-proclaimed) omnipotence of the United States reveal a profound ignorance.

„Why is the American government supporting and subsidizing US aircraft industry through defence contracts? Simply because the future of the US, and of Europe in our case, is not in perfume or popcorn. The future is in electronics, computers, aircraft, missiles and space.” – the remark was made by Jean Pierson, ex-president of Airbus Industrie, in 1987.

The eventful history of the military aircraft Joint Strike Fighter (F35) is like an educational fable. It enables us to contemplate on the one hand the sometimes almost perverse mechanisms of US foreign and defence policy and, on the other, the process of voluntary abandonment of European positions and strengths. In short, it acts as an eminently instructive “digest” of the transatlantic relationship.

If the year 2005 is that of United Nations, it is not so much because of the festivities around its 60th birthday, but rather because of the report of a High-level Panel of personalities, deposited last December on the request of the Secretary-General, and entitled "A more secure world". Indeed, the fate which will be reserved to the content of this document of a hundred pages will send a strong message, be it positive or negative, regarding the future of the organization.

It is not the United States which behaves in an unexplainable way, but we Europeans. Indeed, Washington's acts and deeds are completely foreseeable, in conformity with its position. This does not make them less dangerous neither for themselves, nor for others, and does not reduce the enormous gap between their pretended intentions and their genuine aspirations. But America’s behaviour is fundamentally logical.

It is not "in a galaxy far, far away", but nevertheless beyond the Earth's atmosphere that one of the most enthralling rounds of the transatlantic match takes place. Although we cannot speak about genuine competition. Whereas for the United States the stake is to ensure an absolute control over all space activities, Europe, for its part, can only aspire to try to avoid total dependence.

The area of security and defence policy is the one registering the most noticeable positive shifts within the new EU Treaty (referred to as the constitution). These novelties - along with all finally adopted arrangements - are crucial regardless of the "constitution's" immediate fate: they demonstrate the delicate equilibrium between the minimum requirement for effective functioning and the maximum degree of political willingness at the level of the Twenty-Five.

The mixed report of the EU Commission on Turkey’s accession marked the end of a double deceit. The one which made Ankara believe in the mirage of fully-fledged membership (obviously already as a candidate Turkey does not have the same rights as others). And the other one intended for the European public opinion and pretending that successive enlargements do not basically alter the Union’s very nature. Because it is precisely what they do.