For the past twenty years, the United States has been pushing the Alliance to become “global”, on the grounds that it must adapt to new risks and threats if it wants “to stay relevant” (meaning: to be useful for American interests and to ensure, in exchange, that the USA stays engaged on the old continent). After all, it is only fair. Except that for the European allies this would mechanically lead to giving up their own policies. The challenge for them would therefore be to prevent, as much as possible, the expansion of NATO’s competencies to other (non-military) domains and to other (non-euro-Atlantic) geographical areas. For one of the main rationales behind NATO “going global” is to make sure that Europeans – who, in NATO, find themselves in a subordinate position vis-à-vis the USA – formulate their various policies no longer on their own, but within the U.S.-led Atlantic Alliance. ...

By setting his sights on the island of Greenland, President Trump has provoked, as usual, a mixture of consternation, opprobrium and widespread hilarity on the international stage. Most of the comments limited themselves to criticizing his style and his moodiness: he spoke of a “large real estate deal” and, in the face of a refusal to sell, he canceled his planned visit and described the Danish Prime Minister’s reaction as “nasty”. More astute observers have pointed out that Trump's initiative is less whimsical than it might seem at first glance – it is part of a regional policy America has been pursuing for a while. In any case, for Europeans it is not what really matters. What is essential, to them, is rather the exposure, in broad daylight, of an American reasoning that is as compelling as it is uncomfortable. ...

The recent effort by France, the United Kingdom, and Germany to create a financial mechanism designed to bypass U.S. extraterritorial sanctions on Iran reveals an increasing need for self-assertion vis-à-vis the United States. For months, Europeans have been seeking ways to preserve the nuclear deal despite President Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw from it. Their efforts have less to do with policy towards Tehran than with positioning the European Union in relation to the U.S., and with visions of Europe itself as an international player. ...

France and Germany recently decided to share the presidency of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and jointly do the agenda-setting and public communication tasks it involves, over the next two months. What could be an important symbol appears, however, more like a smokescreen to conceal the two partners’ skirmishes over their respective UN seats. The Germans wish to see France’s permanent member status Europeanized—in other words, transferred to the European Union as a whole. Paris continues to respond to such suggestions with a resounding non. At first glance, this disagreement might look like French national “egoism” standing in the way of Germany’s splendid ambitions for Europe. On closer inspection, however, it is rather the other way around. ...

After a virtually faultless first year in office, French President Emmanuel Macron has faced more difficult times in recent months. Admittedly, his speeches are as eloquent as ever—about the international order, about France, and about Europe—and he is still much appreciated worldwide as the defender of multilateralism (at the United Nations), of the environment (recently awarded “champion of the Earth”), and of economic righteousness (the International Monetary Fund and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development welcome his market-liberal proposed reforms). Nevertheless, “his people,” as he likes to refer to his fellow citizens in the foreign media, seem today distinctly lacking enthusiasm. 

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