Hopes for a spectacular relaunch of the European Union’s Franco-German “motor” after Brexit have thus far failed to materialize. Quite the contrary, now that Paris and Berlin find themselves without the British “third wheel,” almost every issue seems to trigger a bilateral squabble. Whether it is armaments cooperation, energy supply from Moscow, or policy towards Turkey, Franco-German disagreements keep rising to the surface. One of these has drawn much attention recently since it relates to the very nature of Europe and its links to the United States: the question of whether or how Europe (by which they usually mean the European Union) should pursue more strategic autonomy. Although the term has come to be associated with current French President Emmanuel Macron, the concept goes back almost 60 years to the first President of the Fifth Republic, General Charles de Gaulle.

(...) All the positive change in tone on the U.S. side does not necessarily mean easier negotiations or any benefits for Europe in the long run. Paradoxically enough, the more jovial the atmosphere, the more some European governments will be tempted to make concessions, abandon common EU positions and drop even the idea of self-assertion vis-a-vis the U.S. That would only add to the relationship’s asymmetry. The challenge, for Europeans, is to strike the right balance: seize the opportunity of a less confrontational American stance, without reverting back to old reflexes of excessive deference. 

It is a truism to say that the Western-type liberal order is not in a particularly great shape today, some (defenders and opponents alike) would even go as far as to refer to as being “in decay”. There is no doubt about Western liberalism as we know it undergoing a two-front attack: challenged from the outside, through the rise of authoritarian regimes, as well as from the inside due to the spread of so-called populism. It would certainly be comfortable to think of these as objective developments, mostly out of our control – evil forces at play. The only thing we can and need to do, in this vision, is to come together, join our forces and reassert our values, as a response. Nothing could be farther from the true. No adequate response is possible, or even imaginable, without first acknowledging our own responsibility in the current state of affairs. Especially in Europe, where we consistently have made ourselves weak and thereby put our Union, our countries and our citizens at the mercy of these “evil forces”.

The recent effort by France, the United Kingdom, and Germany to create a financial mechanism designed to bypass U.S. extraterritorial sanctions on Iran reveals an increasing need for self-assertion vis-à-vis the United States. For months, Europeans have been seeking ways to preserve the nuclear deal despite President Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw from it. Their efforts have less to do with policy towards Tehran than with positioning the European Union in relation to the U.S., and with visions of Europe itself as an international player.

After a virtually faultless first year in office, French President Emmanuel Macron has faced more difficult times in recent months. Admittedly, his speeches are as eloquent as ever—about the international order, about France, and about Europe—and he is still much appreciated worldwide as the defender of multilateralism (at the United Nations), of the environment (recently awarded “champion of the Earth”), and of economic righteousness (the International Monetary Fund and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development welcome his market-liberal proposed reforms). Nevertheless, “his people,” as he likes to refer to his fellow citizens in the foreign media, seem today distinctly lacking enthusiasm. 

The recent entry into office of the new Italian government was received, in media and financial circles, as well as by most European leaders, with a mixture of indignation and concern. How could Italy—one of the founding members of the Union and its birthplace due to the Treaty of Rome—bring to power Eurosceptic, anti-establishment forces likely to jeopardize the stability of the euro and to create unprecedented tensions within the EU? The alliance between the far-right League and the Five Star Movement (M5S) stemming from a leftist, anti-globalization ideology, is regarded by many as the unfortunate confirmation of the rise of all kinds of “populisms” and therefore as a reversal of the virtuous pro-European momentum generated by last year’s election of French President Emmanuel Macron.

The turbulences in the European and transatlantic skies over the course of the past year obviously have not been without impact on the coexistence between the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union's (EU) Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). Long-time taboos have been lifted, initiatives are multiplying, new perspectives seem to open up, and immediately generate powerful backlashes. The outcome will depend largely, once again, on the choices made, and determination displayed, by France.

 “One only comes out of ambiguity to their own detriment,” this maxim often repeated by former President François Mitterrand sounds like a premonitory warning in the aftermath of Emmanuel Macron’s election in France.

The concurrence between Brexit (expected to revitalize a European defence on which London has always imposed strict limits) and the election of D. Trump in the United States (shedding light on the risks and uncertainties stemming from a situation of dependency) seems to have an almost seismic effect on the architecture of European and transatlantic security.

At the last NATO summit in Warsaw, the top priority was to demonstrate, as the last paragraph of the final communiqué declares, "our unity, our solidarity and our strength". But on each of the three points, serious doubts remain. Whether it is unity (common front against commonly perceived threats), solidarity (an attack against one of the members considered an attack against all) or force (in the area of intelligence, decision-making , deployment of troops), the allies' attitude reveals deeply set tensions.

All too often, it is tempting to equate American nuclear presence in Europe to its sole tangible dimension. Namely the stationing of hundreds of U.S. bombs in five countries of the European continent, as part of NATO and of its so-called "nuclear sharing". And it is a mistake to do so.

The year 2008 was that of a triple anniversary and of a double illusion with regard to European defence. Fifteen years ago, the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty marks the official launch of the CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy), with the prospect of a possible future defence component.

The following brief overview proposes to summarize the principal developments of the year 2007 in the field of European defence. In this regard, two preliminary remarks are of order. The first one is terminological; it relates to the denomination ESDP (European security and defence policy) used up to now, present paper included. It is bound to become, once the new treaty ratified, CSDP (Common security and defence policy). The second remark consists in stressing that the developments and the debates in 2007 continue to revolve around the most controversial concept in European defence, namely the term of ‘autonomy’.

These last months saw the forceful return of the good old debate on “protectionism” versus liberalism. In other words, on the respective roles of the politics and the economic, or face to face between the logic of power and the logic of the market. With the implicit question about the need for a “European preference”, and the immediate spotlight this directs on the inherent contradictions of the liberal-Atlantic credo.

Contrary to the two dominant, albeit diametrically opposed, types of forecasts that were both highly fashionable a few years ago, it appears more and more clearly that the headaches related to the EU-NATO conundrum are here to stay. Those who, in view of the initial difficulties of establishing mutually acceptable relations between the two organizations, were talking about teething problems likely to be replaced, in due course, by a harmonious insertion of the new-born European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) into the Atlantic system, were just as wrong as those who saw in it yet another occasion to toll the death knell of the North Atlantic Alliance. As it is, neither of the two scenarios seems close to becoming a reality any time soon.

After listing some of the major stakes related to the armament sector, a brief historical reminder is devoted to clarifying the context of the current debates. Then certain general characteristics of the American and European defence industries are going to be examined. Finally, misleading myths are to be deciphered, in particular the imposture of the technological “gap”, the holy horror inspired by the concept of “fortress Europe” and the tendentious praise of “complementarity”.

During the last year of the Clinton administration and the first nine months of the Bush team in power, a broad consensus had taken shape in the expert conferences and semi-official meetings on the two sides of the Atlantic: everyone agreed that the NMD (National Missile Defense) was going to become "the" great topic of controversy of the following months and years.

NATO’s Riga summit, held at the end of last November, was the typical example of a spectacular non-event. Striking especially by the contrast between the publicity made for the gathering of 26 Heads of State and government on the one hand, and the piteous outcome of the meeting on the other. The marketing-type announcements planned for the occasion had gradually left the place to the invading reality represented by the deplorable performance of the allies in Afghanistan. This latter being, in addition, only one of the (far too) many symptoms of the growing malaise within Alliance.

The armaments sector is the par excellence strategic field, be it in geopolitical, economic or technological terms. Due to the coincidence between the most abstract questions related to sovereignty and the most tangible nature of the products (origin, composition, design), the policies pursued in this area are particularly revealing of, and determining for, the direction Europe is about to take.

In the public relations offensive carried out from Brussels - with the explicit or implicit support of a large part of the private industrial sector - article 296 is presented as being at the origin of the European fragmentation in the armament field. The only error of this otherwise attractive reasoning is that it confuses cause and consequence. Because far from being the source, article 296 is rather the reflection of our divisions. In particular that of the divergences, not to say differences, of intra-European viewpoints on the very idea we have on Europe’s future: power or not, European or not.

The present paper offers a brief overview of the terminological-historical, theoretical and political aspects of “differentiated integration” scenarios. It argues that although “flexibility” is the only way to consolidate the acquis and pursue the integration project, differentiation does not automatically lead to a more ambitious, more powerful and more European Europe. In order to ensure this outcome, the flexibility pioneers must pay particular attention to two paramount criteria.

First of all, it is worth underlining that neither the French elections of 2007, nor those in the United States in 2008 are bound to alter in a notable way - i.e. in addition to the gestures and effect-based announcements scheduled for these occasions - the traditional orientations of the two countries’ foreign and security policies. Likewise, the calvaries of the new European treaty, the actual rhythm of the EU’s blind rush to enlargement, and the endless transatlantic initiatives based on stylistic changes in Washington are equally secondary from the point of view of the real evolutions in European integration and in our relationship with the United States.

When we examine the relationship between civilizations, one should first of all make a clear distinction between State actors, which do have the right and the capacity for political action, and cultural spheres of variable scale and cohesion, which do not. As the excellent American analyst, William Pfaff observed: "None of these civilizations, rather arbitrarily defined, is or ever was, as such, a political actor or a political entity. Nations act. Governments wage wars. But civilizations are not political units and there is no hint that they will ever become one". This does not mean, far from it, as one will see it hereafter, an underestimation of cultural and identity-related factors.

According to a widely known phrase pronounced by then Luxemburg Foreign Minister Jacques Poos at the beginning of the 1990’s, the EU is “an economic giant, a political dwarf and a military worm”. Whereas far from being incorrect, this definition needs some updating and, most of all, serious clarification.

The present framework only allows an inevitably approximate overall outline of the political processes and strategic stakes behind the armament issues. The conducting line is simple: in the field of defence industries and technologies, we are talking about the material bases of sovereignty, in other words the concrete pillars of the autonomous capacity to decide and to act. Each and every measure with regard to research, development, production and procurement is a political decision in the strictest sense of the term. It is therefore in this quality that it must be apprehended and transferred from the intimate circle of specialists right onto the public place. Since political decisions deserve political debate.

The present analysis examines one of the crucial points of the debates on the European Union’s evolution, namely the issue of "differentiation". With respect to this integration approach, commonly known under the names of "multi-speed Europe", "hard core" or "variable geometry", the paper underlines the fact that in itself this is neither a positive, nor a negative category. Whether increasing differentiation will lead to the disintegration or the revitalization of the integration depends, in fine, on two things: in the service of which policy and applying which modalities these flexibility measures will be put in practice.

EU-NATO relations are merely a symptom. They are the reflection of the power struggle between the two sides of the Atlantic on the one hand, and of intra-European schizophrenia on the other. At the heart of this complex arm-wrestling there is one single crucial issue at stake: European autonomy. As regards the choice allegedly to be made between EU-NATO co-operation or competition, this is a false dilemma. In the current balance of power situation, both are inevitable.

From the French point of view enlargement cannot relegate to the second plan the aspiration to European independence and prosperity. On the contrary: the CEE countries’ accession must be carried out in a way to serve the cause of the preservation of the European model and of Europe's sovereignty.

By pure coincidence, it was in Madrid, in December 1995, that the EU summit took place, where on the matter of terrorism the heads of state and government of the Fifteen stated for the first time what they could not but repeat eight years later – following the terrorist attacks on 11 March 2004 in the Spanish capital.

European-American structural tensions – breeding for decades and becoming acute with the end of the bipolar era – were merely brought onto surface by the Iraq crisis. Beyond the official pseudo-vision and occasional visions represented by German hesitations, the two genuine, concurring visions about Europe, transatlantic relations and the international order are advocated respectively by the British and the French.

A casual observer of Concordia – code-name for the European Union’s first-ever military operation, conducted in Macedonia – would be first impressed by the abundance of symbols in almost every aspect of the mission. Not only do the politicians’ declarations put the emphasis on the „symbolic European message” carried by the operation[1] or present it as a „significant step forward in the long process of European integration”[2], but also the EU seems determined to plant its blue flag all over the place in order to increase its visibility – a goal explicitly identified as one of the key objectives of  the mission.[3]