By setting his sights on the island of Greenland, President Trump has provoked, as usual, a mixture of consternation, opprobrium and widespread hilarity on the international stage. Most of the comments limited themselves to criticizing his style and his moodiness: he spoke of a “large real estate deal” and, in the face of a refusal to sell, he canceled his planned visit and described the Danish Prime Minister’s reaction as “nasty”. More astute observers have pointed out that Trump's initiative is less whimsical than it might seem at first glance – it is part of a regional policy America has been pursuing for a while. In any case, for Europeans it is not what really matters. What is essential, to them, is rather the exposure, in broad daylight, of an American reasoning that is as compelling as it is uncomfortable.

The turbulences in the European and transatlantic skies over the course of the past year obviously have not been without impact on the coexistence between the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union's (EU) Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). Long-time taboos have been lifted, initiatives are multiplying, new perspectives seem to open up, and immediately generate powerful backlashes. The outcome will depend largely, once again, on the choices made, and determination displayed, by France.

NATO’s counter-terrorism efforts have been the focus of much attention in recent months. Faced with a U.S. ultimatum that Washington might “moderate its commitment” to the Alliance, member states have sought ways to demonstrate that the organization plays a significant part in global counter-terrorism efforts and that it could do even more.

At the last NATO summit in Warsaw, the top priority was to demonstrate, as the last paragraph of the final communiqué declares, "our unity, our solidarity and our strength". But on each of the three points, serious doubts remain. Whether it is unity (common front against commonly perceived threats), solidarity (an attack against one of the members considered an attack against all) or force (in the area of intelligence, decision-making , deployment of troops), the allies' attitude reveals deeply set tensions.

Should the SNP’s (Scottish National Party) anti-nuclear stance be a problem for an independent Scotland eager to keep its membership card in NATO ?* In short, not really. Calling for the removal of UK nuclear weapons from its territory and becoming a non-nuclear state is not a priori inconsistent with membership in NATO. Reminder: 20 member countries out of the current 28 do not possess and/or host any nuclear weapons on their soil.

All too often, it is tempting to equate American nuclear presence in Europe to its sole tangible dimension. Namely the stationing of hundreds of U.S. bombs in five countries of the European continent, as part of NATO and of its so-called "nuclear sharing". And it is a mistake to do so.

Hailed (or intensely disparaged, it depends) as a "return to the fold", would the reintegration by France of the integrated military structures end up exploding the Alliance? The question is paradoxical only in appearance.

Contrary to the two dominant, albeit diametrically opposed, types of forecasts that were both highly fashionable a few years ago, it appears more and more clearly that the headaches related to the EU-NATO conundrum are here to stay. Those who, in view of the initial difficulties of establishing mutually acceptable relations between the two organizations, were talking about teething problems likely to be replaced, in due course, by a harmonious insertion of the new-born European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) into the Atlantic system, were just as wrong as those who saw in it yet another occasion to toll the death knell of the North Atlantic Alliance. As it is, neither of the two scenarios seems close to becoming a reality any time soon.

NATO’s Riga summit, held at the end of last November, was the typical example of a spectacular non-event. Striking especially by the contrast between the publicity made for the gathering of 26 Heads of State and government on the one hand, and the piteous outcome of the meeting on the other. The marketing-type announcements planned for the occasion had gradually left the place to the invading reality represented by the deplorable performance of the allies in Afghanistan. This latter being, in addition, only one of the (far too) many symptoms of the growing malaise within Alliance.

EU-NATO relations are merely a symptom. They are the reflection of the power struggle between the two sides of the Atlantic on the one hand, and of intra-European schizophrenia on the other. At the heart of this complex arm-wrestling there is one single crucial issue at stake: European autonomy. As regards the choice allegedly to be made between EU-NATO co-operation or competition, this is a false dilemma. In the current balance of power situation, both are inevitable.

A casual observer of Concordia – code-name for the European Union’s first-ever military operation, conducted in Macedonia – would be first impressed by the abundance of symbols in almost every aspect of the mission. Not only do the politicians’ declarations put the emphasis on the „symbolic European message” carried by the operation[1] or present it as a „significant step forward in the long process of European integration”[2], but also the EU seems determined to plant its blue flag all over the place in order to increase its visibility – a goal explicitly identified as one of the key objectives of  the mission.[3]