After deliberately de-Europeanising the name of the group formerly known as EADS, the CEO of Airbus remains true to his vision. When it comes to the announced selling of the defense electric branch, Tom Enders declares he is indifferent to the acquirer's nationality, as only the price matters ...

These last months saw the forceful return of the good old debate on “protectionism” versus liberalism. In other words, on the respective roles of the politics and the economic, or face to face between the logic of power and the logic of the market. With the implicit question about the need for a “European preference”, and the immediate spotlight this directs on the inherent contradictions of the liberal-Atlantic credo.

How can we reconcile two fundamentally different logics: that of the armaments sector with all the strategic imperatives linked to it, and that of the European construction which oscillates between a quasi-political entity and a mere large market? Intervention at the European Trade Union Symposium of the FNTE (National Federation of the Workers of the State) of the CGT.

After listing some of the major stakes related to the armament sector, a brief historical reminder is devoted to clarifying the context of the current debates. Then certain general characteristics of the American and European defence industries are going to be examined. Finally, misleading myths are to be deciphered, in particular the imposture of the technological “gap”, the holy horror inspired by the concept of “fortress Europe” and the tendentious praise of “complementarity”.

The armaments sector is the par excellence strategic field, be it in geopolitical, economic or technological terms. Due to the coincidence between the most abstract questions related to sovereignty and the most tangible nature of the products (origin, composition, design), the policies pursued in this area are particularly revealing of, and determining for, the direction Europe is about to take.

In the public relations offensive carried out from Brussels - with the explicit or implicit support of a large part of the private industrial sector - article 296 is presented as being at the origin of the European fragmentation in the armament field. The only error of this otherwise attractive reasoning is that it confuses cause and consequence. Because far from being the source, article 296 is rather the reflection of our divisions. In particular that of the divergences, not to say differences, of intra-European viewpoints on the very idea we have on Europe’s future: power or not, European or not.

The so-called code of conduct, which came into effect on July 1, 2006 with the participation of 22 Member States of the Union and is supposed to encourage the “Europeanization” of defence procurement, is only the beginning. It marks the entry in scene, in implacably concrete terms, of the fundamental political questions (differed since more than a half-century) of the European construction. As a beginning, it is by nature imperfect and ambiguous. But at the same time, it reflects perfectly the possibilities and the limits of the political will that is at its origin. 

As for the systematically hidden choice between European dependence or independence, in the texts, everything seems crystal clear. When the ESDP (European Security and Defense Policy) was launched in June 1999 in Cologne, the Declaration of the Fifteen immediately stipulated the need for autonomy and credibility of the Union's means and assets. This is in line with the objectives set out in Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union, in particular the "safeguarding of the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity" of the EU. However, not only are we still waiting to see when these beautiful words will be translated into deeds, but the very question of whether they should be one day remains an object of debate.

First of all, it is worth underlining that neither the French elections of 2007, nor those in the United States in 2008 are bound to alter in a notable way - i.e. in addition to the gestures and effect-based announcements scheduled for these occasions - the traditional orientations of the two countries’ foreign and security policies. Likewise, the calvaries of the new European treaty, the actual rhythm of the EU’s blind rush to enlargement, and the endless transatlantic initiatives based on stylistic changes in Washington are equally secondary from the point of view of the real evolutions in European integration and in our relationship with the United States.

The present framework only allows an inevitably approximate overall outline of the political processes and strategic stakes behind the armament issues. The conducting line is simple: in the field of defence industries and technologies, we are talking about the material bases of sovereignty, in other words the concrete pillars of the autonomous capacity to decide and to act. Each and every measure with regard to research, development, production and procurement is a political decision in the strictest sense of the term. It is therefore in this quality that it must be apprehended and transferred from the intimate circle of specialists right onto the public place. Since political decisions deserve political debate.

„Why is the American government supporting and subsidizing US aircraft industry through defence contracts? Simply because the future of the US, and of Europe in our case, is not in perfume or popcorn. The future is in electronics, computers, aircraft, missiles and space.” – the remark was made by Jean Pierson, ex-president of Airbus Industrie, in 1987.

The eventful history of the military aircraft Joint Strike Fighter (F35) is like an educational fable. It enables us to contemplate on the one hand the sometimes almost perverse mechanisms of US foreign and defence policy and, on the other, the process of voluntary abandonment of European positions and strengths. In short, it acts as an eminently instructive “digest” of the transatlantic relationship.