By setting his sights on the island of Greenland, President Trump has provoked, as usual, a mixture of consternation, opprobrium and widespread hilarity on the international stage. Most of the comments limited themselves to criticizing his style and his moodiness: he spoke of a “large real estate deal” and, in the face of a refusal to sell, he canceled his planned visit and described the Danish Prime Minister’s reaction as “nasty”. More astute observers have pointed out that Trump's initiative is less whimsical than it might seem at first glance – it is part of a regional policy America has been pursuing for a while. In any case, for Europeans it is not what really matters. What is essential, to them, is rather the exposure, in broad daylight, of an American reasoning that is as compelling as it is uncomfortable.

With the recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and the decision to transfer the U.S. embassy there, U.S. President Donald Trump has made a first step to break one of Europe’s most deeply anchored reflexes. As former European Commissioner Chris Patten noted, “The main determinant Europe’s political behavior” is, on the Israel-Palestine issue in particular, “the Pavlovian rejection of any course of action that might distance Europe from the Americans.”

A couple of seconds within a two-and-a-half hour television interview propelled French President Macron on the front pages of international media, as the one who claims he persuaded President Trump to change his policy in Syria. Macron repeated four times that "we convinced him” to maintain US troops in the country and to limit air strikes to the regime’s chemical weapons sites. This publicly made statement is more than a diplomatic gaffe. It also, and above all, reveals that the French president is tempted by a rather naive approach to relations with America, the same that had, time and time again, led Britain into an impasse.

The concurrence between Brexit (expected to revitalize a European defence on which London has always imposed strict limits) and the election of D. Trump in the United States (shedding light on the risks and uncertainties stemming from a situation of dependency) seems to have an almost seismic effect on the architecture of European and transatlantic security.

During a discussion at the Atlantic Council in Washington, the European Union’s High Representative was quite adamant, repeating the same words three times, in calling for America to not interfere in European affairs. Nothing could be more legitimate, one would say. Provided that Europeans stick to it as a general rule (and not a mere case by case grievance, this time triggered by controversial statements from president Trump).

The special position of the UK in the European and transatlantic security field will be one of the key defining elements both for the attitude of other States vis-a-vis a possible Scottish independence (would or would not they prefer to see London weakened even if just temporarily), and for their appreciation of the policies pursued by an independent Scotland (would they be in line with, or different from, those of Whitehall). Looking at the possibility of Scottish independence from a transatlantic-European security perspective implies examining three different albeit closely related subjects:

This (and similar) kind of information could only become “explosive” if, thanks to the Wikileaks “scoop” for instance, the general public began to ask serious questions. And not about America – but about their own leaders' behaviour.

Contrary to the two dominant, albeit diametrically opposed, types of forecasts that were both highly fashionable a few years ago, it appears more and more clearly that the headaches related to the EU-NATO conundrum are here to stay. Those who, in view of the initial difficulties of establishing mutually acceptable relations between the two organizations, were talking about teething problems likely to be replaced, in due course, by a harmonious insertion of the new-born European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) into the Atlantic system, were just as wrong as those who saw in it yet another occasion to toll the death knell of the North Atlantic Alliance. As it is, neither of the two scenarios seems close to becoming a reality any time soon.

After listing some of the major stakes related to the armament sector, a brief historical reminder is devoted to clarifying the context of the current debates. Then certain general characteristics of the American and European defence industries are going to be examined. Finally, misleading myths are to be deciphered, in particular the imposture of the technological “gap”, the holy horror inspired by the concept of “fortress Europe” and the tendentious praise of “complementarity”.

During the last year of the Clinton administration and the first nine months of the Bush team in power, a broad consensus had taken shape in the expert conferences and semi-official meetings on the two sides of the Atlantic: everyone agreed that the NMD (National Missile Defense) was going to become "the" great topic of controversy of the following months and years.

First of all, it is worth underlining that neither the French elections of 2007, nor those in the United States in 2008 are bound to alter in a notable way - i.e. in addition to the gestures and effect-based announcements scheduled for these occasions - the traditional orientations of the two countries’ foreign and security policies. Likewise, the calvaries of the new European treaty, the actual rhythm of the EU’s blind rush to enlargement, and the endless transatlantic initiatives based on stylistic changes in Washington are equally secondary from the point of view of the real evolutions in European integration and in our relationship with the United States.

Euro-American relations are periodically tarnished by so-called "misunderstandings", verbal skirmishes, diplomatic incidents and other manifestations of mutual distrust that seem to rise out of nowhere, literally from one day to the next. Their perception is actually dramatized by the fact that they emerge from under the cover of what is presented as an impeccable relationship, based on a much-touted community of values and interests. This contradiction increases the risk of visceral reactions on both sides of the Atlantic: anti-Americanism in Europe and Europe-bashing in the United States.

European-American structural tensions – breeding for decades and becoming acute with the end of the bipolar era – were merely brought onto surface by the Iraq crisis. Beyond the official pseudo-vision and occasional visions represented by German hesitations, the two genuine, concurring visions about Europe, transatlantic relations and the international order are advocated respectively by the British and the French.