The necessity for the European Union (EU) to play a more assertive role in the Balkans is on the agenda now more than ever. In fact, after the events of 11 September 2001, the withdrawal of the bulk of the US troops from the region and their replacement by European contingents is, for the first time, considered as a politically feasible (and militarily sensible) option. At the same time, the EU’s evolving defense policy has been declared “operational” at the Laeken summit in December 2001, with all the related institutions in place and with the Western European Union’s (WEU) crisis management capabilities and functions transferred to the EU. The EU is therefore theoretically the actor that is most competent to play a military role (in addition to other, more traditional aspects of EU crisis management) in the neighboring Balkan region.
In addition, the experience of the Eurocorps, having been in command of the KFOR operation from March to October 2000, is seen by many as a point of reference opening the way for more ambitious missions. Last but not least, the Macedonian crisis in 2001 demonstrated that the stabilization process of the whole region is far from over, and that the military component still constitutes an integral part of the toolbox for achieving this aim.
This chapter seeks to make the case for a greater EU military presence in the Balkans. In doing so, it attempts to comprehend the relationship between the EU’s past and present experience in the Balkans and the evolution of the Union’s military role. It argues that the Balkans is likely to go on influencing the development of the EU’s military force by providing it with its first major test. However, in order for this “test” to be passed successfully, the EU must meet a number of challenges still facing its military role in the region.
The EU and the Balkans: The Implications of Cohabitation
Traditionally, the EU regards its utmost priority as bringing stability and prosperity to the whole of the European continent. Obviously, this mission is much more a vital interest than a mere altruist, value-based vocation for the EU. The view that trouble in one part of the continent is a problem for the whole continent increased in relevance at the beginning of the 1990s with the dramatic events accompanying and following the demise of the former Yugoslavia. After the Helsinki decision on enlargement in December 1999 (i.e., the invitation to open accession negotiations with an additional six countries, including Bulgaria and Romania, as well as the recognition of official candidate status for Turkey), the stability of the region became an even more crucial issue for the EU: Southeastern Europe (SEE) ceased to be simply a region of Europe’s backwaters whose flare-ups need firefighting by Europe; it is now regarded as a part of the Continent that is eventually to be integrated into the EU. Therefore, the stakes are now even higher, and the consequences of possible failure even more serious for both the region and for the EU in general.
A wide array of nonmilitary instruments It is obvious that “Europe” and “the Balkans” are not two distinct entities, but rather two interconnected parts of the same European area. Recognition of this fact is reflected in the EU’s deep involvement – in arenas such as economic, financial, and diplomatic – in the whole Balkan stabilization process from the very beginning of the conflicts. The declared aim of the EU is to create in SEE a situation in which military conflict will become unthinkable, and thereby to expand the zone of peace, stability, prosperity, and freedom that the current 15 member states have created over the last 50 years to SEE. With this in mind, the EU is by far the single largest assistance donor to the western Balkans as a whole. Through its various aid programs the EU has provided more than €6.1 billion between 1991 and 2001, and, in the year 2001, over €845 million has been made available for the Phare, Obnova, and CARDS aid programs.
In the 1990s, the EU’s political, trade, and financial relations with the western Balkan region focused on crisis management and reconstruction, reflecting the countries’ emergency needs at that time. However, as the region emerges from that difficult period, a more long-term approach to its development is clearly required.
The Stability Pact (SP) launched by the EU and adopted by the Cologne meeting of the European Council on 10 June 1999, which embraces the countries of the region as well as others (including the US), is an important element in the EU’s effort to foster peace and democracy across the whole region. The initiative arose in late 1998, and thus predates the war in Kosovo. Yet, that war later undoubtedly acted as a catalyst in strengthening international political will for coordinated preventive action in the region. In fact, the SP is the first serious attempt by the international community to replace the previous reactive crisis intervention policy in SEE with a comprehensive long-term conflict prevention strategy.
Also in May 1999, the European Commission set out the rationale for moving towards a more ambitious vision for the region’s development. This was based on:
• A recognition that the main motivator for reform – including the establishment of a dependable rule of law, democratic and stable institutions, and a free economy – in these countries is a relationship with the EU that is based on a credible prospect of membership once the relevant conditions have been met. This prospect was offered explicitly at the Feira European Council meeting in June 2000;
• The need for the countries to establish bilateral relationships amongst themselves to allow development of greater economic and political stability in the region;
• The need for a more flexible approach which, although anchored in a common set of political and economic conditions, allows each country to move ahead at its own pace. Assistance programs and contractual relations have to be flexible enough to accommodate a range of situations from postconflict reconstruction and stabilization to technical help with matters such as the standardization of legislation with the core elements of the EU acquis.
This led to the proposal by the European Commission, on 26 May 1999, of the so-called Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), and Albania in order to enhance the existing “regional approach” of the EU vis-à- vis these countries. The SAP aims to stabilize the region and restore cooperation between Balkan countries by offering them the prospect of joining the European integration process. In brief, the SAP helps the region to secure political and economic stabilization by developing a closer association with the EU, involving new kinds of contractual relations (the tailor-made Stabilization and Association Agreements) and thereby opening a road towards eventual EU membership once the conditions have been met. In fact, for most countries in the region the SP and the SAP can only be provisional and transitory; they cannot replace the accession process, with its final goal of acquiring full membership in the EU. The most important political instrument of the EU in the SEE region is precisely the promise of full membership – provided the political and economic criteria are met, and the reform policies are implemented.
To aid this complex and manifold process, the EU had already adopted liberal trade policies towards SEE, allowing more than 80 per cent of regional exports to enter the EU duty-free. And on 18 September 2000, the Council of Ministers decided to further extend duty-free access to the EU market for products from SEE; this trade liberalization took effect on 1 December 2000. Fully-liberalized access to the markets of the EU is also foreseen as part of the Stabilization and Association Agreements.
The EU’s Limited Military Presence in the Region
The EU is also present on the ground. For example, in Kosovo some 36’000 troops (80 per cent of the total force) and 800 civilian police from EU member states serve alongside international partners, but there are several reasons why this fails to constitute an assertive EU presence. First, the military participation of EU member states suffers from a significant lack of credibility, in that there is a widespread perception that European military are only good for so-called soft security tasks, unlike the war-fighting US soldiers. Second, EU member states hold diverse opinions regarding the extent to which the EU should and could be militarily involved, and although the EU has indeed been acknowledged as the main donor for reconstruction and development, its role in military-related aspects is still far from being generally accepted. Third – and closely linked to the above-mentioned diverse opinions – military-type European involvement has thus far simply not happened under the EU flag, i.e., upon decisions of the EU Council.
One of the consequences of such a low-profile military presence, paired with an ambitious economic and diplomatic program such as the SP is that “given Europe’s Balkan track record, the SP’s efficiency and longevity will suffer from such an imbalance between war-making and peacekeeping or reconstruction.” The main problem here is the lack – from the EU’s side – of necessary coherence between diplomacy (using both political and economic instruments), coercive diplomacy and the use of force, and the credible threat of use of force (implying both political and military credibility).
The EU’s quasi-absence in the military dimension of post-conflict resolution in the Balkans (or at least the absence of an EU flag associated with the European military presence), as well as its lack of credibility in defense matters (due partly to the political divergences between the 15 member states, and partly to its lack of convincing capabilities) threaten the credibility – or even the undermining of – other, nonmilitary EU efforts in the region, even though it is quite obvious that eventual integration into the EU is the key incentive (reference, anchor, and motivation) for SEE countries to move towards stabilization and democratization.
The EU and Its Military Role: Inherent Schizophrenia?
Paradoxically, any EU initiative in the region suffers from the lack of military credibility to underpin it, but events in the Balkans have undoubtedly played a key role in the creation and the development of the EU’s defense dimension. The Yugoslav conflicts have not only revealed the impact of instability on the rest of the European continent, but also highlighted the interdependence of both “hard” (military) and “soft” (nonmilitary) security. It became apparent to all that “a long-term, coordinated, and coherent international presence, the core part of which will be European, will therefore be needed to implement change and transition through combined means, encompassing the whole spectrum of conflict prevention and crisis management mechanisms.”
If the EU possessed the tools and instruments for the largest, nonmilitary part of this spectrum, it notoriously lacked both capabilities and competence in the military dimension. The lessons of the Balkan crises revealed the necessity for Europe to acquire the appropriate means – conceptual, operational, and institutional – to address crises on its own continent. Already possessing and putting into use a whole range of economic, political, and diplomatic instruments, the EU launched the creation and the reinforcement of its defense dimension. The EU is committed to enhancing security, but not in becoming a military actor per se. Therefore, its recent endeavors in the field of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) must be seen as an additional tool – albeit an important and necessary one – in a broad and unrivalled range of economic, political, and diplomatic capabilities. Also, the development of the common ESDP stems mainly from the very logic of European integration – the shift from a mere economic power to a political one, the progressive building of its strategic dimension, and thereby the emergence of Europe as a global actor on its own right. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the Balkan crises had a significant impact on the actual shaping and acceleration of ESDP. Most notably, the Balkan wars of 1991 to 1995 and the lessons learned from them have greatly contributed to the Amsterdam Treaty’s (mainly institutional and procedural) improvements in the field of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)?ESDP, whereas the Kosovo intervention triggered a positive dynamic on concrete capabilities and commitments, as well as more-audacious strategic objectives, the whole process occurring with unprecedented speed and determination.
The emergence of the EU’s military dimension would and should enlarge the EU’s field of competence from economics and politics to defense, enabling the management of all the dimensions of crises in Europe, including military ones. Yet the effective functioning of a coherent CFSP–ESDP is hampered, delayed, and even called into question by a number of – mostly internal – factors. Several of these are relevant to the Balkan case:
• Budget insufficiency, or rather inefficiency, including duplications among EU member states, overspending on force structures and personnel, inappropriate budget distribution, and segregated defense industries;
• Difficulties linked to the transatlantic relationship, including the politically sensitive issue of division of labor, and differing degrees of emancipation from the US desired by different EU member states; • Divergent approaches among member states as to the very nature (e.g., all economic or mostly political) of the integration, let alone its – par excellence political and highly sensitive – military component; • Inter-pillar rivalry and redundancy within the EU, which hampers effective implementation of a coherent crisis management policy, and a lack of unity even within the second pillar (different rules of the game for CFSP and for issues “having military implications”);
• Capability deficiencies, or the lack of key assets in the field of command and control, strategic and tactical air- and sealift capabilities, and satellite intelligence. However, it should be noted that in spite of all reproaches from Washington pointing to the so-called capability gap, European efforts to palliate these deficiencies often meet a hostile US reaction if they do not follow the “buy American” order or risk allowing real strategic autonomy for the EU, as was the case for the A400M and the Galileo navigation system, for example.
Given that defense issues are at the heart of the remaining national sovereignty of EU member states, the evolution of the ESDP is closely – even if not openly and officially – linked to the debate on the political-institutional future of the EU. As long as even tentative solutions do not emerge on issues as fundamental as “what do we want to do together?” or rather “which member states want to do which policy areas together?,” European defense is arguably condemned to ad hoc responses, involving slow, often ill-coordinated mechanisms and ambitions necessarily reduced to the lowest common denominator. The common denominator will become even lower as the number of member states attempting to reach a consensus on extremely delicate issues grows from 15 to some 30. It is therefore foreseeable that if European defense is to function, it will need to do so in a flexible framework, on the basis of closer cooperation among “the willing and able.” For the time being, all these long-term uncertainties count mainly as factors hindering a coherent and efficient EU military involvement in the Balkans. (Just like anywhere else, as was demonstrated by the debate surrounding the possible sending of troops to Afghanistan, the impossibility of even conceiving an EU peacekeeper–observer envoy to the Middle East, and EU military presence in Africa. The obstacles are also visible most recently in the Balkan context, on the issue of the EU taking over the role of NATO in Macedonia, for example).
The way ahead for the EU becoming an effective international actor with credible military component is long and bumpy, but the ultimate goal – i.e., the EU being able to deal, even autonomously, with the crises in its own backyard and becoming a more capable partner with the US in dealing with security problems – seems such a sound and legitimate one, and it is quite popular among EU citizens, as shown by Eurobarometer results.13 These results indicate that “European defense” has continuously been among the most favored issues, with popular support reaching well above 70 per cent in recent years.
One of the key conditions for maintaining this popular support – obviously necessary for all serious defense investment – is to choose sen sible, easily explainable and realistic strategic goals that are seen as linked to real European interests. Some analysts point out therefore that while the EU should think strategically and globally, it should start with the nearest neighbors: “The EU should be an active, outward-looking global player, and should deepen its political relations with Asia, Latin America, and Africa. But it should focus attention on the Balkans, the Middle East, Russia, Ukraine, and North Africa.” The EU’s foreign, security, and defense policies should start by taking care of its own backyard. Within this backyard, it is clearly in the Balkan region that Europe has the most “accumulated experience”; and the highest stakes in the sense that this region will geographically not only be neighboring but in the heart of the enlarged EU; and also – most unfortunately – the most opportunities for attempting to manage complex crisis situations, in which – as far as it can be foreseen – the military component would only play an additional, rather minor, but nevertheless necessary role.
EU’s Military Role in the Balkans: A Mission by the Force of Things
The current European presence in the Balkans – 80 per cent of the approximately 50’000 NATO troops on the ground are European – reveals that a stronger European military role for the Balkans is, in a sense, not a question for the future but rather a fact of the present. Nevertheless, the absence of the EU flag over this European presence demonstrates that most of the factors impeding a stronger military role for the EU in the Balkan region are based on political rather than capability considerations. This is all the more so given that the current situation in the Balkans appears to have reached a point where Kosovo-type coercive actions – those which are generally mentioned as “the most demanding of the Petersburg tasks” to be executed by the EU according to the Helsinki Headline Goals (HGs)– can be, if not ruled out completely, at least considered as a contingency scenario.
At the same time, in the post-11-September environment, a major attention shift is underway on the part of the US, with an unavoidable impact on the Balkan region. In fact, this development will only reinforce already ongoing tendencies, such as that the gradual disengagement of the US in the direct post-war management of the Balkans will increase, and the devolution to the EU of full responsibilities for the Balkans will accelerate. Some experts say that, “the post-11-September environment places stronger demands on the political leaders of the region and on the European guardians of the process.” In a sense the governments and other players in the area will be called upon to make a “leap in maturity, overcoming their dependence on external forces of stabilization which post-11-September tendencies render increasingly difficult. Conversely, the EU will have to remain involved in the area, and be even more aware of its role as the primary regional stabilizer.”
Nevertheless, previous European attempts at military involvement in Balkan crisis-management processes brought to light some capability deficiencies and serious political obstacles within the EU, which continue to constitute the “variable factor” for future EU engagements.
Previous Attempts to Get Involved
In the light of past experience and more recent controversies on possible operations, some concrete examples are unfolding as to the extent and number of difficulties lying ahead of an effective EU military engagement in the Balkan region. In fact, European military forces have been very active in the Balkans throughout the past decade, in operations varying from peace enforcement to peacekeeping to humanitarian assistance. In spite of the display of serious capability deficiencies and the obvious need for further changes in force structures, European military forces have performed well in many of these operations, and obtained significant experience from which to draw in the process of meeting the capability and force structure challenges, as well as in the creation of a credible ESDP. Nonetheless, recent developments still point to the above-mentioned substantial political divergences between EU member states towards defense issues in general, or vis-à-vis the EU’s defense dimension. The fate of the “test balloon” sent up by the EU special envoy to Macedonia at the beginning of September 2001, or the much-publicized leaks about British reaction to the EU taking over the operation in Macedonia in July, all attest to the need for substantial changes – on the basis of more flexibility – if the EU is to become a global (or even regional) player in the security field.
From the experience of the UNPROFOR, IFOR, KFOR, and SFOR missions, operation Alba, and the Kosovo intervention, one can argue that “over the past several years in Bosnia and Kosovo, European militaries have become increasingly effective, have carried a greater percentage of the troop burden, and have commanded the international military presence. Moreover, as illustrated by innovative advances such as the Multinational Specialized Unit, European militaries have shown a willingness to adapt operationally to circumstances on the ground.”
However, these same experiences have demonstrated the desperate need for changes in European force structures (e.g., the shift from the predominantly territorial-defense force structure to lighter, more mobile, and easily deployable power-projection forces) and for enhanced capabilities (mainly in the field of reconnaissance and surveillance, target acquisition, and strategic air- and sealifts, as well as in command, control, and communication capabilities) in order to be able to meet the challenges posed by the rapidly evolving ESDP process.
The EU’s Immediate Challenges
Some observers argue that 11 September 2001 may lead to “a longterm reduction of US interest in security issues around the fringes of Europe (…) however unprepared and divided it may be, the EU will have no choice but to assume greater responsibility for aspects of Continental security.” It seems more and more probable that the Balkan stabilization process – with its ongoing difficulties and potential emergencies – will provide the EU with the first few opportunities to test the most recent changes in its military dimension. Namely, the police mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the takeover by the EU of the NATO-led operation in Macedonia would be the first genuinely EU operations under the aegis of ESDP.
The EU police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina would test the civilian aspect of the ESDP’s crisis-management capabilities. The General Affairs Council meeting in Brussels between 18 and 19 February 2002 announced that the EU was ready to deploy an EU police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina to take over from the international police task force in January 2003. Its main task will be the establishment of sustainable local police structures, and will require monitoring, mentoring, and inspecting Bosnia and Herzegovina police managerial and operational capabilities, with particular emphasis on exercising appropriate political control over the police. Although this first EU-led mission is to be seen as a milestone in the operationalization of ESDP, some argue that the reluctance of member states to consider it as precedent-setting will risk entrenching the ESDP in a tradition of ad hocism.
In addition to the British government’s reluctance to get involved in an EU-led mission in Macedonia, the ongoing Greek– Turkish dispute over the EU–NATO defense agreement could postpone and endanger the first EU military operation. At their informal meeting on 23 March 2002, the defense ministers of the EU member states discussed preparations for taking over NATO’s lead in the 700-strong Macedonian task force “Fox,” an operation assisting local authorities in the protection of observers from the EU monitoring mission and from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), as from September 2002. However, the long-awaited formal agreement with NATO on assured access to NATO’s resources (the so-called Berlin Plus agreement) was clearly identified as a precondition for launching the operation.
The current dynamic characterizing the development of the EU’s military dimension (the ESDP) was stimulated by the common determination to learn from previous European failures in the Balkans and the general desire never to get caught the same situation again. The EU’s security is now viewed as intimately connected to that of the Balkans. Recognition of this is reflected in the Union’s deep involvement – economically, financially, and diplomatically – in the whole Balkan stabilization process. Future security thinking in Europe, as well as the fate of the ESDP, will no doubt continue to be shaped by experiences in the Balkans. The post-11-September environment is likely to accelerate the gradual disengagement of the US from the Balkans and the devolution of full responsibilities for the post-war management of the Balkans to the EU. This is likely to provide the first major test of the ESDP. As Jolyon Howorth puts it, “the aim should be for the EU progressively to assume direct responsibility, under ESDP, for Balkan stabilization. This ought to be considered as the minimum operational remit of an effective ESDP. If the EU does not have the political courage or the military wherewithal to assume such a mission, then it surely needs to ask itself what precisely ESDP is for.”
The case for the EU assuming greater responsibility for stabilizing its nearest neighbor is all the more strong given the complex nature of the Balkan crises, and that the new types of risks involved (the interconnection between soft and hard security) seem to fit a more comprehensive, European-style response, encompassing a broad range of instruments as well as long-term political solutions, rather than a strictly military approach to crisis management. Nevertheless, as long as the EU has no credible – both in capability and political terms – military tool at its disposal (in case of escalation, or just as a means of deterrence), its influence in shaping the future of the region will not be commensurate with its efforts and resources involved in the stabilization process. It is not only that “the western Balkans pose a real threat to the security and stability of the current and future member states,” but also that it threatens “the credibility and authority of the EU as a global actor.”24 In a larger context, it is the possibility of the EU becoming one of the pillars of the future, desirably multipolar international system that is now at stake in the Balkans.
(In: Unraveling the European Security and Defense Policy Conundrum, ed. J. Krause, A. Wenger, L. Watanabe. Studies in Contemporary History and Security Policy, Vol.11, Bern, 2003)
 “Declaration on the Operational Capability of the Common European Security and Defence Policy,” Presidency Conclusions of the European Council Meeting in Laeken, 14?15 December 2001 (Brussels: General Secretariat of the Council, 2001), Annex II.
 See Timothy Garton Ash, “Europe’s Endangered Liberal Order,” Foreign Affairs (March/April 1998).
 See Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, ed. The Southern Balkans: Perspectives from the Region, Chaillot Paper, No. 46 (Paris: The Institute for Security Studies, 2001).
 “When it comes to nation-building or civilian administration or indefinite peacekeeping, we do need for the Europeans to step up to their responsibilities. We don’t need to have the 82nd airborne escorting kids to kindergarten,” statement by Condoleezza Rice to the New York Times, 21 October 2000.
 On the difficulty of military involvement under EU flag, see Section 2.
 Daniel N. Nelson, “The Southeast Europe Stability Pact: Stability Without Security Is Bad for the Balkans,” speech at the East European Studies Noon Discussion, The Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, D.C., 20 October 1999. Nelson even affirms that “The Stability Pact is not what we or the Balkans needed. It is diplomatic Prozac at a time when shock therapy is required. It offers inducements and rewards before the heavy lifting. It suggests that we can buy and educate the Balkans towards market democracy in the long term, before a secure milieu exists in which to nurture such fragile institutions.”
 Sophia Clement, “The Balkans and Beyond: The European Perspective on Future Regional Stability,” in East European Studies/West European Studies Special Reports, available at http://wwics.si.edu/ees/special/2000/clemen.pdf.
 Julian Lindley-French, “Boosting Europe’s Military Muscle – the Build-Up and Future Role of the EU Rapid Reaction Force,” lecture in the Cicero Foundation Great Debate Seminar Europe: An Emerging Global Actor?, Paris, 9 to 10 March 2000.
 The EU member states’ approach to military operations in Afghanistan was telling in this respect: the declaration of the extraordinary European Council meeting in Brussels (September 2001) had to be amended – on demand from neutral member states – to include not that the EU as a whole, but only EU member states would support any US response. In October, at the Ghent summit (and at Tony Blair’s London dinner), it became evident that on the grounds of rejecting the exigencies of the “big three,” the other EU members are not willing to tolerate closer cooperation on defense.
 Steven Everts, “Shaping a Credible EU Foreign Policy,” analysis for the Centre for European Reform, 19 February 2002.
 Nicholas Whyte, “Europe and the Balkans, a Year After Milosevic,” CEPS Europa South East Information Center, October 2001.
 François Léotard suggested on 5 September 2001 that the EU send a force to replace NATO’s 4’800 multinational force after their 30-day mission (Essential Harvest) ends. But EU diplomats reacted promptly and unanimously stating that the proposal only reflected his private view.
 Britain’s reluctance to participate and its reservations about military engagement under the EU flag in Macedonia became obvious after the EU foreign ministers’ meeting in Caceres, Spain, on 9 February 2002, when they decided that the EU should take over the responsibility for the Macedonian peace force from NATO. As a leaked letter from the British defense minister’s office put it: “There would be a real risk that the EU’s first mission would end in failure, or rescued by a reengaged NATO, which would be disastrous in presentational terms (….) An EUled operation in Macedonia would not be ‘premature’ but simply wrong.” At the same time, another leaked letter, from the Foreign Secretary Jack Straw’s office, informed the prime minister there was a strong political case for taking part on the ground: “If we do look like becoming isolated, we would better accept an EU mission, and seek to shape it to our own specifications.” See “UK Troops May Join Euro Army,” BBC News Online, 3 March 2002; “Britain Says EU Not Ready to Send Peace-keeping Force to Macedonia,” Euractiv News, 4 March 2002.
 John G. McGinn-Timothy Liston, “Beyond the Rhetoric and Acronyms: The Reality of European Military Capabilities,” in National Security Studies Quarterly, Volume VII, Issue 1 (Winter 2001): 75–96.
 Nicholas Fiorenza, “Balkan Lessons: European Ground Forces Become Leaner, But Are They Meaner?” Armed Forces Journal International (June 2000): 68– 74.
 Anatol Lieven, “The End of NATO,” Prospect, December 2001.
 Jamie Woodbridge, “Putting ESDP to the Test: The EU’s Police Mission to Bosnia–Herzegovina,” European Security Review, March 2002.
 After having blocked the EU?NATO agreement for two years, Turkey, a NATO but not an EU member, agreed with Britain and the US in December 2001 to lift its objections after receiving guarantees that EU operations would not endanger Ankara’s interests in the region. Greece, an EU and NATO member, now demands the same assurances, stating its historical problems with Turkey as the reason. The issue has gained importance ahead of the November municipal elections in Greece. Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis has warned that giving a nonmember, such as Turkey, a say on the EU’s defence policy would undermine the EU’s autonomy and principles. He reiterated that Greece would veto the deal in its present form. See “EU Military Operation in Macedonia in Doubt,” 16 May 2002, available at http://www.euractiv.com.
 Jolyon Howorth, “The European Security Conondrum: Prospects for ESDP After September 11, 2001,” Notre Europe Policy Paper, No. 1, March 2002, 14.
europe de la défense